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The defined benefit system and the federal insurance program
that stands behind it are being tested more severely than at any
time since enactment of ERISA 30 years ago. At stake is the
viability of one of the principal means of providing stable
retirement income to millions of American workers. Although the
challenges are multi-faceted, defy easy answers and demand a
careful balancing of interests to devise workable solutions, such
solutions are achievable. The time to act is now.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1974, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) to preserve and protect the pension plans of
millions of American workers.2 At that time, a series of business failures
resulting in the loss of promised plan benefits had prompted Congress to
seek corrective legislation.' ERISA aimed to safeguard employer-
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1. 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION 10 (Mar. 1,
2005) (Executive Director's Report) [hereinafter 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT].
2. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974); see also ERISA §§ 1-4402. ERISA's tax provisions are duplicated in I.R.C. §§
400-25 and its nontax provisions are recodified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
3. See generally James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the
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sponsored pensions by mandating adequate funding levels and plan
4termination insurance.
Today, more than three decades later, it is clear that neither method
will likely provide the pension protection originally intended in the statute.
In fact, the present economic and social environment has potentially placed
thirty-two thousand pension plans covering forty-four million workers in
jeopardy along with the program that insures them.' Asset funding levels
of defined benefit pension plans are well below minimum legislative
standards, with total under-funding estimated at more than $650 billion.6
Moreover, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) created by
ERISA to insure against plan termination and support employees with
minimum benefits no longer has sufficient assets to meet its long-term
liabilities.7
Given the dire financial condition of defined benefit plans in the
private sector8 and the impending demise of their insurer, legal scholars
have contributed their ideas to the pension reform discussion.9 Various
Business ": The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L.
REV. 683 (2001) (detailing the history and origins of ERISA); see also JOHN H. LANGBEN &
BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 1-28 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining
historical development of the private pension system).
4. 26 U.S.C. § 412 (establishing minimum funding standards); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a),
1321(b)(1), 1301-1461 (2000) (establishing plan termination insurance). ERISA's other
reforms included imposing fiduciary duties, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(l)(B), 409; vesting
requirements, see 26 U.S.C. §411; and participation standards, see 26 U.S.C. §401(a)(26).
5. 2005 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION I (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 PBGC Performance & Accountability
Report]; see also 2005 Annual Report, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (June 28,
2006) [hereinafter 2005 PBGC Annual Report].
6. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 13; see
also 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-17 (reporting total under-funding
exceeding $600).
7. "[I]t is clear that the Corporation does not have sufficient resources to meet all of its
long-term obligations." 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. In 2004, the
PBGC experienced the largest loss in its thirty year history. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 4. As discussed infra Part IV.A., its financial position eroded by $12.042
billion, more than doubling its deficit to $23.541 billion. Id. at 14, 21.
8. Most public sector defined benefit plans are also in an extremely vulnerable
financial condition. For an analysis of public pension plans and proposals for reform, see
Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform is
Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees, Vol. 21, No. 1, Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy, publication forthcoming Spring 2007.
9. See, e.g., Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4
FLA. TAX REV. 607 (2000) (suggesting voluntary insurance coverage for defined
contribution plans); Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security
Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 69-70 (2004) (proposing mandatory defined benefit or
contribution plan prior to the establishment of 401(k) plans or mandate matching funds in
401(k) plans); Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 65, 67 (1991) (proposing "to transfer primary responsibility for monitoring
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bills have also entered the legislative process seeking to solve the current
crisis in corporate America.'° One such bill - the Pension Protection of Act
of 2006 - recently became law on August 17, 2006.'
This article adds to the growing debate over private pensions by
proposing two reforms. First, it concurs with the recently enacted
legislation that legitimates employer transition to the cash balance form of
pension plan. Second, in contrast to the new statute, it suggests a reduction
in insurance benefits payable to participants of terminated plans and/or an
extension of the age of retirement to promote the continued viability of the
PBGC. These proposals best accomplish ERISA's primary purpose of
pension protection as well as account for the fundamental changes in the
employment relationship that have developed since its enactment.
Part II reviews the role of private pensions as part of the employment
relationship. Part III explains three popular pension plans and discusses
employer attitudes and objectives that may influence the choice between
them. Part IV delineates the private pension dilemma and its determinants.
It details the unfunded liabilities of defined benefit plans and the related
fiscal distress of the PBGC. It also describes the environmental factors
influencing the problem. Part V outlines the two proposed reforms and
their justifications in light of economic, social, and political realities. The
employers' pension funding from the PBGC to private creditors"); Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 529-30, 532-33 (2004) (proposing to
legitimate cash balance plans and to limit employer stock in defined contribution plans);
Kathleen H. Czarney, Note, The Future of Americans' Pensions: Revamping Pension Plan
Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's Deficit, 51 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 153, 191-95 (2004) (proposing portion of defined benefit pension assets be
invested in FDIC insured accounts).
10. See, e.g., Preservation of Defined Benefit Plans Act of 2005, H.R. 4274, 109th
Cong. (2005) (introduced Nov. 9, 2005); Pension Security Disclosure Act of 2005, H.R.
2321, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced May 12, 2005); Pension Preservation and Savings
Expansion Act of 2005, H.R. 1960/1961, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced April 28, 2005);
Pension Fairness and Full Disclosure Act of 2005, S. 991, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced
May 10, 2005); Employee Pension Preservation Act of 2005, S. 861, 109th Cong. (2005)
(introduced April 20, 2005). While there has been new urgency due to the increased rate of
business failures and unfunded liabilities discussed infra at Part IV, pension reform has
never left the legislative agenda. See EVERETT T. ALLEN, JR., JOSEPH J. MELONE, JERRY S.
ROSENBLOOM & DENNIS F. MAHONEY, PENSION PLANNING: PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND
OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 17-21 (9th ed. 2003) (discussing no less than
twenty different federal statutes affecting pensions since the enactment of ERISA).
11. The new statute is the most comprehensive pension reform legislation in at least a
decade. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th Cong. (2006) (previously the
Pension Security and Transparency Act of 2005, S. 1783/H.R. 2830, 109th Cong. (2005)),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/taxdocs/pensiontextptl .pdf; see also
Legislative Notice, U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, H.R. 4 - Pension Protection
Act of 2006 (Aug. 2, 2006), available at
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/L53HR4PensionsO8O2O6DK.pdf (discussing history of the
legislation).
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article concludes that the suggested options are a viable means to the end of
encouraging the continued growth of private pensions in the twenty-first
century.
II. ROLE OF PENSIONS IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Private pensions mutually benefit both employers and employees.
They offer advantages to the employer by solving the problem of
diminished productivity due to advanced age.' 2  At some point, an
employee's contribution to the productivity of a firm may be worth less
than his or her compensation. Establishing a pension plan permits
employers to encourage retirement while simultaneously reducing the
inefficiencies associated with retaining employees beyond their productive
years. 3 Compared to terminating employees whose wages outpace their
value, morale and productivity will often be maximized through the
provision of a pension.14
Offering a pension plan also permits an employer to systematically
replenish its workforce by keeping the channels of promotion open to
younger workers. 5 While transferring aging employees to less demanding
and lower income positions may be possible, such an alternative only
delays the inevitable productivity problem. 16 Furthermore, an employer's
contributions to a qualified plan are deductible for federal income tax
purposes.' 7 Tax deductions allow a portion of the plan's liabilities to be
funded at lower cost to the firm.
Pension plans provide employees economic security at a time when
employment opportunities are limited or non-existent but financial needs,
especially health care, are still substantial. s With the ever increasing
longevity of the population, the need for financial security during
retirement is evident. 9 Another employee benefit of pensions is that
12. ALLEN ETAL.,supra note 10, at 9-10.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. For workers still in their productive prime, however, the 'tight' labor market
may oblige employers to encourage the continuation of employment. See Robert L. Clark &
Sylvester J. Schieber, Taking the Subsidy Out of Early Retirement: Converting to Hybrid
Pensions, in INNOVATIONS IN RETIREMENT FINANCING 169-70 (Olivia S. Mitchell, Zvi Bodie,
P. Brett Hammond & Stephen Zeldes eds., 2002) (discussing the role of pensions and
national retirement policy).
16. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 9-10.
17. Id. at 10-11.
18. Id. at 7-8; see also Anna M. Rappaport, Planning for Health Care Needs in
Retirement, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 288 (Olivia S.
Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, & Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000) (discussing the increase in
healthcare cost and need that accompanies the aging process).
19. See discussion infra, Part IV.B.2.
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employer contributions to a qualified plan do not constitute taxable
income.2° Pension benefits are taxed at distribution when an employee is
presumably in a lower income tax bracket.21
Pensions are especially important because the minimum benefits
available pursuant to Social Security, coupled with its failing financial
health, leaves the government guarantee of income under that program
uncertain.2 Personal savings are still an option, but more people are
choosing to maintain a relatively high standard of living during their pre-
retirement years and forego accumulated savings for old age. 23  The
declining level of voluntary savings means that pensions as a form of
forced savings are critical to protect against the economic risk of old age.24
Because pensions are beneficial to both employers and employees, it is not
surprising that more than half of the population of full-time private sector
workers participate in some form of pension plan.25
III. PENSION PLAN SELECTION AND EMPLOYER OBJECTIVES
Employers are not required to provide pensions, and if they do, the
law does not mandate a selection between them. There is a wide selection
of plan types as well as flexibility of plan design.26 To assist in the
evaluation of the reform proposals outlined below, the next section will
describe three popular plans and then discuss employer attitudes and
objectives that may influence the choice between them.
20. Lee G. Knight, Ray A. Knight, & Wayne T. Nix, An Application of the Analytic
Hierarchy Process To Tax Policy Decisions: The Termination of Overfunded Pension Plans,
12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 101, 106 (1995); see also Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise:
Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (discussing the tax
implications of time).
21. ALLEN ETAL.,supra note 10, at 37.
22. For researchers seeking information on expected social security benefits, see Olivia
S. Mitchell, Jan Olson, & Thomas L. Steinmeier, Social Security Earnings and Projected
Benefits, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 327 (Olivia S.
Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, & Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000).
23. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 7 (noting that personal savings rates are "running at
historically low levels" and citing "[a]dvertising, installment credit, and the media of mass
communications" as factors influencing their restricted growth).
24. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 14.
25. Joint Comm. On Tax'n, Present Law and Background Relating to Employer-
Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans 28 (JCX-71-02, 2002). "[W]ell over half all U.S. workers
in their 50s anticipate a future pension..." Alan L. Gustman, Olivia S. Mitchell, Andrew A.
Samwick, & Thomas L. Steinmeier, Evaluating Pension Entitlements, in FORECASTING
RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 310 (Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond,
& Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000).
26. See generally DALLAS L. SALISBURY, REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS, THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (5 th ed. 2001); PENSION PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) (providing pension plans rules and regulations).
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A. Choice of Private Pension Plans
Three kinds of pension plans predominate in the private sector. They
are the defined benefit plan, the defined contribution plan, and the hybrid
cash balance defined benefit plan.
1. Defined Benefit Plan
Under a defined benefit pension plan, the employer provides a
determinable benefit, usually related to an employee's service and/or pay. 7
Retirement benefits depend on a calculation of average earnings either
under a final average or career average formula28 that tend to favor long-
career workers.29 The payment at retirement is annuitized for the life of the
employee.30  Subsidized early retirement benefits are also usually
embedded into defined benefit plans.3
Moreover, the employer assumes the investment risk.32 This means
that returns above the promised benefit will inure to its benefit.33 Returns
below the promised payout, however, will have to be funded by the
employer.34 Thus, the employer's cost includes the amount necessary to
provide the benefit as well as administrative and actuarial expenses.35
Because defined benefit pensions are insured against default by the PBGC,
an employer will additionally pay insurance premiums per employee for
each employee participating in the pension program.3 6 Employers will also
27. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 47.
28. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 151. The final-pay provision bases benefits on
earnings averaged, for example, over the last three years of employment or over the three
consecutive years in a ten year period immediately prior to retirement in which earnings are
the highest. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 229-34. The career-pay provision bases
benefits on earnings averaged over the entire career of employment. Id.
29. Older participants earn more benefits in their later years because these are the years
of their highest salary and greatest seniority along with the years closest to retirement.
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 720 (2000).
30. 1 GARY I. BOREN & NORMAN P. STEIN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS
§ 1:07 (2001).
31. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 152-53 (citing several studies by economists on
retirement incentives embedded in retirement systems).
32. 3 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS P 61.1.2 (3d ed. 2001).
33. Id.
34. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND
WELFARE BENEFITS 35 (2004).
35. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 225-81; Norman Stein, An Alphabet Soup
Agenda for Reform of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA Provisions Applicable to
Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 56 SMU L. REV. 627, 641 (2003); see also
Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 455 (noting that defined benefit plans are a fixed cost unrelated to
profitability).
36. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 11; see
2007] PRIVATE PENSION LIABILITY AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 501
pay variable rate premiums should their funding ratios fall below the
statutory average.37
2. Defined Contribution Plan
Under a defined contribution pension plan, the employer's
contribution is fixed and accumulates to provide whatever amount of
benefit exists at retirement. 38 A well-known defined contribution pension
plan is the 401(k) plan.39 Because the employee (and not the employer)
assumes the investment risk, his or her benefit becomes the variable as
opposed to the employer's contribution.4 °  Defined contribution
arrangements typically do not provide life-time annuity payments, but
rather allocate benefits in one lump sum.4  The single payment enhances
the account's portability and is advantageous to employees who end their
employment relationship prior to retirement.42  The potential disadvantage
to employees, however, is that they may outlive their retirement
resources.
43
also discussion infra at Part IV.A and note 218.
37. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 8, 11, 43;
see also discussion infra at Part IV.A and note 213. The Pension Protection Act of 2006
calls for one hundred percent funding. See, e.g., Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note
11, tit. IV.
38. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDtN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF
401(K) PLANS 2 (Brookings Institution Press 2004); Jonathan Barry Forman, Public
Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, 1999 L. REV.
MICH. ST. U.-DET. C.L. 187, 193-94. The contribution formula is based on salary and
sometimes length of service. MICHAEL J. CANAN & DAVID RHETT BAKER, QUALIFIED
RETIREMENT PLANS § 3.12 (2001).
39. See Robert L. Clark, Gordon P. Goodfellow, Sylvester J. Schieber, & Drew
Warwick, Making the Most of 401(k) Plans: Who's Choosing What and Why?, in
FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 95 (Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett
Hammond, & Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000); see also Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final
Straw and How To Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DuQ. L. REv. 69, 78 (2002) (listing various
defined contribution plans such as 401(k), profit sharing, stock bonus, money purchase,
ESOPs, and 403(b)).
40. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 48.
41. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED
CLIENT 11.02 (2000).
42. MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 38, at 2-3.
43. Jeffrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell, & James M. Poterba, Mortality Risk, Inflation
Risk, and Annuity Products, in INNOVATIONS IN RETIREMENT FINANCING (Olivia S. Mitchell,
Zvi Bodie, P. Brett Hammond, & Stephen Zeldes eds., 2002). Employees do have the
option of attempting to annuitize payments. See Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four
"Truths" of Personal Social Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(k) Plans,
81 N.C. L. REv. 901, 959 (2003) ("Annuity providers will price the traditional annuity at a
higher cost to account for this systemic increased risk of longevity among purchasers of
traditional annuities."); see also Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 463-64 (noting that the option is
rarely used).
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3. Cash Balance Plan
The cash balance plan is a hybrid defined benefit plan.44 It arguably
combines the best features of the defined benefit and contribution plans. 45
Cash balance plans are like defined contribution plans because they
create hypothetical accounts for employees based on their contributions at a
specified rate of interest.46  Cash balance plans are like defined benefit
plans because the employer bears the investment risk and guarantees a
particular benefit at retirement.4 7 If the account earns more interest on the
funds, the employer keeps the excess.48 If the account earns less interest,
the employee is still assured an amount at the specified interest rate. 9
Cash balance plans provide a more uniform increase in benefits during
continued employment and do not have the significant spike in benefits
embodied in the final average formulas of the traditional defined benefit
plans.5 ° Rather than offering deferred annuity payments based on a salary
and service formula,5' cash balance plans typically distribute retirement
benefits in one lump sum.
52
Cash balance plans are good for employees because they offer
universal coverage, portability of benefits, and little investment risk.
5 3
They are good for employers because they allow them to appeal to mobile
workers while simultaneously retaining career workers by discouraging the
early retirement that is typically offered with conventional plans.54 While
employers are still obligated to insure against default by the payment of
44. Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(i)(2002); see also I.R.S. Notice 96-8 (Jan. 18,
1996) (stating cash balance plans are not defined contribution plans but defined benefit
plans); Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 817 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (reaching the same
conclusion). Other hybrid plans include pension equity plans and life cycle pension plans.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 345-53.
45. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 502. For the legal framework governing cash balance
plans, see Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 715-16.
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a)(4)-8(c)(3)(i) (2002). The account is hypothetical because
the company does not actually pay the funds in the employee account, but rather pools it
with the funds of other participants. See THE SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, ACTUARIAL ASPECTS
OF CASH BALANCE PLANS 1 (2000) (defining cash balance plans as a series of "notional"
accounts for each participant).
47. Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 693.
48. Id. at 693-94.
49. Id.
50. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 151; see also Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 722-23
(explaining that in annuity terms, "cash balance plans frontload rather than backload.").
51. ALLEN ETAL., supra note 10, at 345-46.
52. Patrick J. Purcell, Cong. Research Serv., Order Code RL30496, Pension Issues:
Lump-Sum Distributions and Retirement Income Security, at 6 (2003).
53. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 171.
54. See STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 240-46 (1997); see also
Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 171 (commenting on the low growth rate in the labor
market which would make encouraging continued employment of workers more valuable).
2007] PRIVATE PENSION LIABILITY AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 503
premiums as under the conventional defined benefit plan, the lack of early
retirement subsidies and more level benefit accruals make cash balance
plans less costly.
55
B. Employer Attitudes and Objectives
Employer attitudes and objectives influence the decision to offer a
pension plan and the form that plan will take.56 Attitudes fall along a
continuum from paternalistic notions to individualistic ideals.57 The former
paternalistic employer would be oriented toward protecting employees
against economic insecurity.58 Employers within this category would use
traditional defined benefit plans and bear the risks of funding, investment,
and longevity to ensure their employees had sufficient income throughout
their retirement.5 9 The latter individualistic employer would be oriented
toward an approach that would have employees share in the cost of meeting
their own economic security or would place the responsibility for financing
and managing retirement accruals on employees as under a defined
contribution plan.60 The middle ground provided by cash balance plans
would allow employers and employees to share in the risks of retirement.
Employers would guarantee benefits, but allocate the amount in one lump
sum.
Employer objectives can range from recruitment needs to cost
imperatives. 6' They will vary in relative importance depending on the
particular purposes served by the pension and the situation. Considerations
for pension design would include the maturity of the company, anticipated
growth, profit margins, capital requirements, predictability of profits, level
of competition, and employee characteristics.62 Ideally, employers would
wish to meet employee needs and offer funding patterns consistent with
objectives and capabilities.
If objectives included the recruitment and retention of workers,
defined contribution or cash balance plans would be more suitable for
younger, more mobile workers who appreciate portability.6 3 Companies
55. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 159.
56. Environmental influences on pension choice are discussed infra at Part IV.B.
57. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 28-32.
58. Idat 28-29.
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 32-43; see also Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 704-14 (discussing employee
motives in abandoning defined benefit plans with final average formulas, for embracing
defined contribution plans and choosing cash balance plans rather than defined contribution
plans).
62. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 32-43.
63. Reece, supra note 39, at 78; Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension
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seeking a more mature workforce may opt for the defined benefit format
which, due to its back-loaded nature, offers greater benefits for older
workers.64
With the cost of employee benefits overall accounting for one-third or
more of payroll, 65 cost concerns are probably important in plan choice.
Such concerns would include legal compliance, administrative ease, and
contribution flexibility, which are typically maximized under the defined
contribution plan.66 While still subject to premiums under the PBGC and
actuarial expenses, the cash balance variant also offers potentially more
leeway in favorable accounting treatment than the traditional annuity-based
defined benefit plan.67 The lump sum distribution of retirement income
also provides better control of future costs.
6
IV. PRIVATE PENSION PROBLEM
More than forty-four million American workers participate in defined
benefit plans. 69 They are the pensions of choice for seventy-five percent of
companies listed on the S&P 500.70 Pursuant to ERISA, defined benefit
pension plans are insured by the PBGC.7"
Plans: Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of Jonathan Skinner, Ph.D Economics) (citing employee appreciation of the
portability of defined contribution plans); see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 32-33
(advising that recruitment incentives should asses competitive standards in the industry or
area that the company operates). But see Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 753 (expressing doubt
that young workers favor cash balance plans due to their portability).
64. Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 754. Like the defined contribution plan, cash balance
plans' intergenerational impact is to favor younger workers. Id. at 754-55.
65. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 26 (noting an average of about thirty to as much as
fifty percent).
66. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 31; Retirement Security and Defined Benefit
Pension Plans: Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong. (2002) (testimony of Ron Gebhardtsbauer, Senior Pension Fellow, American
Academy of Actuaries) (citing federal regulation and complexity of administration as the
primary reason for employer preference for defined contribution plans). Companies may
also want to consider plan termination duties and legal liability, if any, before all accrued
and vested benefits have been funded and its impact on net worth or the ability to raise
capital. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 31.
67. See Mary Williams Walsh, Changes Discussed in Accounting for Some Pension
Fund Obligations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at C1.
68. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 31.
69. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
70. Funding Challenge: Keeping Defined Benefit Pensions Plans Afloat: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 108th Cong. 57 (2003) (citing statistics that include the
cash balance form of defined benefit plan).
71. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-09 (establishing the PBGC); see also Retirement
Security: Picking Up the Enron Pieces: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance (2002)
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The PBGC is a federal corporation that guarantees the payment of
basic pension benefits either by becoming the trustee of under funded plans
upon termination or by providing financial assistance through loans (which
are typically not repaid) in the event a pension fund can no longer pay
benefits when due at the guaranteed level (insolvency).72 The corporation
receives no taxpayer monies and its statutory duties are not backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States Government.73 Instead, PBGC
funding for its underwriting and financial activity comes from insured plan
sponsor premiums, employer under-funding liability payments, income
earned on investments, and any assets taken over from failed plans.74
The PBGC publishes periodic reports that reflect its financial
condition, as well as the condition of the 30,330 active plans it insures.75
The latest information published in the PBGC's 2004 Annual Report, 2005
Annual Report, and 2005 Annual Performance and Accountability Report
demonstrates that many defined benefit plans are on the brink of economic
disaster. The financial insecurity of these private sector pensions has
placed the PBGC itself in a perilous position. The next two sections
discuss the private pension dilemma of the PBGC and its insured corporate
pensions followed by an explanation of its determinants.
A. Failing Financial Health of Defined Benefit Plans and the PBGC
In its latest public report, PBGC management expressed doubt that it
can "satisfy the PBGC's long-term obligations to plan participants. 76 The
Congressional Budget Office agrees. It has projected that the ten year
losses to the PBGC could grow dramatically given the number of exposures
the corporation has currently taken on in its own portfolio as well as the
(prepared statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation) ("PBGC is one of the three so-called 'ERISA agencies' with jurisdiction over
private pension plans. The other two agencies are the Department of the Treasury (including
the Internal Revenue Service) and the Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Administration (PWBA)."). Certain defined benefit plans are exempt, such as those of
professional service employers (physicians, lawyers), see 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(13), (c)(2),
government units, see 29 U.S.C. § 132 1(b)(2), or church based employers, see 29 U.S.C. §
1321 (b)(3).
72. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 6, 10. As
discussed infra at notes 82-85 and accompanying text, the PBGC separately operates single-
employer and multiemployer pension programs. The PBGC's obligations begin upon plan
termination for single-employer pensions and upon insolvency for the multiemployer
pensions.
73. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
74. Id. at 11; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306-1307 (2000) (addressing premium rates).
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 1308 (2000).
76. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
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unfunded status of the plans it guarantees.77
In 2000, the PBGC had an almost ten billion dollar surplus.78 By
2001, however, more than one hundred under-funded plans terminated.79
The record-breaking trend of claims continued into 2005, bringing the
cumulative total of trustee plans to 3,595 with more terminations expected
in the future.8° Indeed, considering plan sponsors whose credit ratings are
well below investment grade or are otherwise in financial distress, the
PBGC's future exposure to new terminations remains high at $108
billion.8' In 2003 and 2004, the exposure risk was $82 billion and $96
billion, respectively.82
The PBGC operates two separate insurance programs for defined
benefit plans: single-employer and multi-employer plans. 83  A single-
employer plan is a corporate pension sponsored by one employer for its
employees. 84 A multi-employer plan is a pension plan sponsored by two or
more employers in the same industry who have collective bargaining
agreements with one or more unions.8 ' These plans cover most workers in
the unionized sectors of the economy that include the retail food,
transportation, garment, and mining industries.86
The multi-employer program reported net income of $25 million in
2004, but still posted a deficit of $236 million.87 In 2005, moreover, the
program reported a net loss of $99 million, with its deficit rising
77. Id. at 5-6 (referencing September 2005 Congressional Budget Office Report).
78. David Cay Johnston, At the Pension Agency, A Much Healthier Glow, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2001, at BU10.
79. At that time, some of the largest plans in PBGC history terminated. PENSION
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (Apr. 11, 2002) [hereinafter
2001 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT] (listing The Grand Union Company (17,000 participants),
Outboard Marine Corporation (10,000 participants), Bradlees Stores (8,000 participants),
Northwestern Steel and Wire Company (4,000 participants), and Laclede Steel Company
(4,000 participants)).
80. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; cf id. at
5 (noting record-breaking numbers of plan terminations from 2002 to 2004).
81. Id. at 4; 2005 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
82. 2005 PBGC Annual Report, supra note 5, at 13.
83. Id. at 10.
84. See 29 U.S.C. §1301(a)(15) (defining single employer plan as "any defined benefit
plan ... which is not a multiemployer plan"); see also The Pension Under-funding Crisis:
How Effective Have Reforms Been? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and the
Workforce, 108th Cong. 4-85 (2003) (statements of Rep. Andrews from New Jersey,
Chairman John A. Boehner, and Rep. Norwood from Georgia).
85. 29 U.S.C. §1301(a)(3). A multiemployer plan is defined as a plan "(A) to which
more than one employer is required to contribute, (B) which is maintained pursuant to one
or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations and
more than one employer, and (C) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary of
Labor may prescribe by regulation." Id.
86. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
87. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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accordingly. 8 ' The single-employer program posted the largest net loss in
program history of $12.067 billion in 2004 and a deficit of $23.305
billion.89 On account of its multi-billion dollar deficit, the Government
Accountability Office placed the PBGC's single employer insurance
program on its list of "high risk" government programs. 90 The combined
programs' underwriting and financial activities for 2004 resulted in a net
loss for the fiscal year of $12.042 billion and a deficit of $23.541 billion.9'
While ERISA mandates that plan sponsors keep funded ratios of
ninety percent, firms with under-funded ratios of more than $50 million
had an average unfunded ratio of sixty-nine percent. 92 Collectively, these
plan sponsors reported $786.8 billion in assets to cover more than $1.14
trillion in liabilities. 93 The companies reported a record shortfall of $353.7
billion in 2005, a twenty-seven percent increase from the year before.94
Aggregate under-funding of multi-employer plans is estimated to exceed
$200 billion.95 Under-funding in single-employer plans exceeded $450
billion as of September 20, 2005.96
88. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 12; 2005
PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
89. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; see also America's Pensions:
The Next Savings and Loan Crisis? Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. On Aging, 108th
Cong. 51 (2003) (prepared statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, PBGC)
("During FY 2002, PBGC's single-employer insurance program went from a surplus of $7.7
billion to a deficit of $3.6 billion-a loss of $11.3 billion in just one year. The $11.3 billion
loss is more than five times larger than any previous one-year loss in the agency's 29-year
history.").
90. PBGC Reform: Mending the Pension Safety Net: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Retirement Security and Aging of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
109th Cong. 3-12 (2005) (testimony of Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director); see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: SINGLE-EMPLOYER
PENSION INSURANCE PROGRAM FACES SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM RISKS 1 (2003) (concluding
that the "long-term viability of the [single-employer] program is at risk"). Every year the
GAO publishes a list of government agencies or programs that have high liabilities and are
considered a "high risk."
91. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14, 23. The PBGC's combined net
position improved slightly in 2005 to $(23.1) billion from $(23.5) billion in 2004 due to
strong investment returns and interest factors. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
92. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. Section
4010 of ERISA mandates financial disclosure for only those companies with more than $50
million in unfunded pension liabilities. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. (showing 1,108 plans covering 15 million workers and retirees).
95. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 13
(illustrating an increase from $150 billion in 2004). Multiemployer plan information is less
current and complete than single-employer data.
96. Id. at 13. The financial position of single-employer plans remained constant from
the year before, but had jumped from $350 billion in 2003. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 18. The under-funding estimate is based on employers' reports to PBGC of
508 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
B. Environmental Influences on Private Pension Insecurity
This section explains the present problem of private pension instability
in light of the general economic decline, the demographics of an aging
population, the increasing amount of labor regulation, and the changing
structure of the labor market.
1. Economic Conditions
Economic conditions affect the financial markets and the rate of
business failures. Both factors have negatively influenced the unfunded
liabilities of corporate pensions and the rising deficit and duties of the
PBGC. 97
As described above, not only do many defined benefit pensions lack
sufficient assets to cover anticipated liabilities, but their collective deficit
measures in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The lack of sufficient
assets in private pensions is attributed in part to the decline in the stock
market beginning in 2000.98
The PBGC's single-employer program experienced investment losses
of $843 million in 2001.99 Three years earlier in 1999, the multi-employer
program posted investment losses of $56 million.'00 Overall, the PBGC has
fared better than its insured plans with assets outperforming liabilities in
seven of the last ten years.'0 ' Nevertheless, PBGC management provides
"no assurance that these results will continue.'' 1 2  They note that the
growth in liabilities over the passage of time will not ordinarily be offset
when the corporation's assets are significantly lower than its liabilities and
when the yields are the same. 03
the market value of their assets and termination liability. Id.
97. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 ("The current massive under-
funding of defined benefit pensions, compounded by the financial struggles of major
industries that rely heavily on these pensions, has greatly increased the risk of loss for the
pension insurance program."); see also 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
98. Czamey, supra note 9, at 179 (detailing downward trend in the stock market since
2000). Even earlier, commentators sounded the alarm that a souring investment climate
increased the "risk that thousands of American workers will not receive retirement
benefits." U.S. Pension Threat Continues to Grow, NEWSDAY, Nov. 20, 1992, at 44; cf
Kaplan, supra note 9, at 53, 70-81 (explaining the problem of overinvestment in employer
stock in defined contribution plans and proposals for reform).
99. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
100. Id.
101. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 24 (noting
asset gain of $700 million for 2005); see also id. at 12 (refusing to project any investment
income for 2006).
102. Id. at8.
103. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
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In addition to market volatility, much of the PBGC's exploding deficit
can be attributed to weaknesses in certain industries such as steel and air
transportation.10 These two industries account for almost three-quarters of
past claims while representing fewer than five percent of the participants
insured by the PBGC.' °5  For example, when the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation's plan terminated, the PBGC inherited $3.7 billion of
unfunded liabilities. 0 6 The plan was reportedly 97% funded as late as
1999, but only 45% funded by 2002.107 The bankruptcy of LTV
Corporation added $1.6 billion in pension obligations with another $1.1
billion from the insolvency of National Steel.
10 8
The problems of the steel industry are symptomatic of what is
happening in air transportation and other traditional industries.'0 9 The
recent spike in oil prices can only contribute to the probability of pension
termination upon the bankruptcy of several major carriers."0  United
Airlines and US Airways have sought protection in bankruptcy with the
goal of shedding their defined benefit pension obligations."' Delta and
Northwest have also filed bankruptcy and may seek to sacrifice pensions as
well."2 Even less known full-service airlines, like Legacy Airlines, have
104. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 34; see also 2005 PBGC
PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 13 (noting PBGC future
exposure is concentrated in the sectors of manufacturing, transportation, communication,
utilities, and services).
105. See 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-35; see also 2005 PBGC
PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 (reporting that its losses are
concentrated in a large number of claims from a relatively small number of terminated
pension plans).
106. The Pension Under-funding Crisis: How Effective Have Reforms Been? Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Education and The Workforce, 108th Cong. 47-49 (2003)
(testimony of J. Mark Iwry, Esq., Non-Resident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution).
107. Id.
108. Mary Williams Walsh, $8 Billion Surplus Withers at Agency Insuring Pensions,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan 25, 2003, at Al.
109. For a detailed discussion of the airline industry and their financial problems, see
Amy Lassiter, Note, Mayday, Mayday!: How the Current Bankruptcy Code Fails to Protect
the Pensions of Employees, 93 Ky. L.J. 939, 946-49 (2004-2005). Economic indicators
suggest that the automotive and communications industries are set to follow in the financial
footsteps of the airlines. See id. at 950.
110. Amy Schatz & Susan Carey, Airlines Take Their Problems to Congress, WALL ST.
J., June 3, 2004, at B2.
111. Susan Carey, Airlines Fighting for Viability, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at A5; see
also Steven D. Jones, Pensions Likely to Stay Dying Breed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at
C3 (noting that Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines intend to impose freezes as part of
their reorganization in bankruptcy). Trans World Airlines terminated its defined benefit
pension plan covering 36,500 workers and retirees in 2001. See 2001 PBGC ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 79, at 9.
112. See David D. John, Special Treatment for Airlines Flaws a Strong Senate Pension
Bill, The Heritage Foundation, Oct. 5, 2005, available at
http://heritage.org/Research/SocialSecurity/
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lost $24.3 billion since 2000.3 with pension under-funding now estimated
at $31 billion.'
4
Collectively, the airline industry defined benefit pension liabilities
exceed assets by $31 billion." 5 In the past two years alone, airlines with
over $25 billion in additional pension under-funding filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.' 6  According to the PBGC, these additional liabilities
significantly increased "the risks facing the pension insurance program and
the resources to respond to those risks."
'" 7
2. Increased Life Expectancy
The changing demographics of the population have also played a role
in the perilous financial situation of defined benefit plans and the entity that
insures them."' The increase in life expectancy is both recent and
dramatic. In one generation, life expectancy at birth rose from forty-seven
years to about seventy-seven years. "9 One impact of increased longevity is
its concomitant increase in the number of persons of retirement age, in
absolute and relative terms.
wm872.cfm (noting that both airlines filed bankruptcy the day before they were required to
contribute $200 million to their pension plans); see also Ellen Shulz, Airlines in Trouble:
Industry's Pension Maneuvers Raise Questions About the Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2004,
at A17. Delta and Northwest had pension liabilities totaling $6.4 and $3.7 billion,
respectively. See Deborah Solomon, David Rogers, & Evan Perez, Congress Nears a
Pension Bill, As Airlines Seem to Get Relief, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2006, at A2, available at
http://www.uswestretiree.org/072006_2.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
113. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: AIRLINE PLANS' UNDER-
FUNDING ILLUSTRATES BROADER PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION SYSTEM 3
(2004) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States)
(discussing the fact that Legacy Airlines is a full service airline that does not offer low cost
airfares and services). In contrast, low-cost airlines made $1.3 billion in profits. Id.
114. Id.
115. Kimberly Blanton, Pensions Grounded?: Airlines Could Be Latest Industry to
Terminate Plans, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2004, at F4; Caroline Daniel, Airline Funds
Plunge to Record $31 Billion Shortfall, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at 30 (totaling under-
funded status of eleven major airlines).
116. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 57 note b
(discussing fiscal years 2004 and 2005).
117. Id.; see also id. at 9 (noting operating expense increase of $48 million due in part to
the expenses associated with the recently terminated airline pension plans in 2005). The
new pension reform legislation provides relief to airlines by extending the time in which
they need to fund their pensions. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 11, Title
IV.
118. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 480; see also id. (noting demographic trends as negatively
impacting defined benefit plans).
119. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8 ("Since 1900, life expectancy at birth has
increased from 47 years to approximately 76.9 years.").
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Growth among employees who are sixty-five years and older is
growing almost four times faster than the total population. 20 In less than
twenty-five years, the number of persons in this age category will double in
size and represent about twenty percent of the total population compared to
only about twelve percent today.1 2' This means one in five Americans will
be sixty-five years or older.
2 2
Longer life expectancy causes defined benefit pension benefits to rise
in one of two ways. Annuities paid by the defined benefit plans will be
paid over a longer period of time or lump sum distributions will be larger
because they are based on the life of the annuity.1 23 Either way, rising
benefits to employees translate into rising costs to their employer.
3. Retirement Regulation
The financial vulnerability of the PBGC and, accordingly, its insured
pension plans is due in part to federal regulation. Despite the best of
Congressional intentions in enacting ERISA to encourage and to support
defined benefit pensions, 24 the statute and those that followed have had the
opposite effect.
Since their peak at nearly 120,000 in 1977, defined benefit plans have
dropped to one-quarter of that number today.1 25 From 1986 to 2003, 97,000
120. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIvISION, STATE INTERIM POPULATION
PROJECTIONS BY AGE AND SEX: 2004-2030 tbl.4 (2005),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/projectionsagesex.html (listing the
change in the total population of the United States between 2000 and 2030 as 29.2% and the
change in the population of those sixty-five years and older as 104.2%).
121. Id. at tbl.5 (providing the number of elderly persons sixty-five years and older for
2000 and projections for 2010 and 2030); see also Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau,
Dramatic Changes in U.S. Aging Highlighted in New Census, NIH Report: Impact of Baby
Boomers Anticipated (Mar. 9, 2006) (highlighting data from a National Institute on Aging
report titled "65+ in the United States: 2005"), http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/aging-population/006544.html. See generally Joseph F.
Quinn, New Paths to Retirement, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT
WEALTH 13-32 (Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, & Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000)
(discussing trends in labor force participation and the age employees are choosing to retire).
122. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 121 (noting some seventy-two
million people will be age sixty-five or more). Notably, the age distribution of the
population age sixty-five and over is also changing with increased percentages at the upper
end of the age scale. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8.
123. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8; see also Jones, supra note 111, at C3 (noting one
reason for the recent company freezes of defined benefit plans is that retirees are living
longer and raising the overall cost of pensions).
124. See ERISA § 1001 (discussing congressional findings regarding employee benefit
plans); see also Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that ERISA was intended to encourage the establishment and growth of private
pensions).
125. Compare PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
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defined benefit plans with seven million participants were terminated. 126 In
contrast, between 1984 and 1993, defined contribution plans grew nine
hundred percent 127 and their numbers continue to increase. 2  Thirty years
ago, there were approximately twice as many active participants in private
defined benefit plans as in private defined contribution plans. 129 Now,
pension experts estimate that "the situation is almost exactly reversed.'
30
In 1998, more than half (fifty-six percent) of workers with pensions
participated solely in defined contribution plans. 131 Only fourteen percent
participated solely in the defined contribution plan, with the remaining
thirty percent participating in both defined benefit and contribution
arrangements. 132  Defined contribution pension fund assets of
approximately $2.1 trillion also exceed the defined benefit pension fund
assets of $1.6 trillion. 3 3 In short, the defined contribution arrangement
trumps the defined benefit in terms of the number of plans, participants,
and assets. 1
34
Analyzing these trends in the context of the regulatory environment,
pension scholars have concluded that the increasingly complex legislation
and its attendant costs to business have deterred the establishment of
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 1996, FORM 5500, ANNUAL REPORTS, tbl.E 1
(1999-2000)[hereinafter PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN], available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/bulletl996/table._el.htm (charting the number of
defined benefit plans in 1997) with 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
supra note 5, at 1 (illustrating the number of defined benefit plans in 2005). In the nearly
twenty year period from 1977 to 1993, defined benefit plans fell to half their number. See
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN tbl.E 1.
126. Funding Challenge: Keeping Defined Benefit Pension Plans Afloat: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. On Fin., 108th Cong. 57 (2003) (prepared statement of Steven A.
Kandarian, Executive Dir., PBGC) [hereinafter Funding Challenge].
127. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 3, at 51.
128. Funding Challenge, supra note 126, at 37-38 (prepared statement of Henry
Eickelberg, Staff Vice President, Gen. Dynamics, representative of the Am. Benefits
Council).
129. Clark, Goodfellow, Schieber, & Warwick, supra note 39, at 95.
130. Id.
131. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (JCX-71-02) 32 (June 18, 2002); see also
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UTILIZATION OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT SAVING 4 (2003)
(noting defined contribution plan participation at forty percent in 1997).
132. STAFFOF JOINT COMM. ONTAX'N, supra note 131, at 32.
133. See Arleen Jacobius, Trillions and Trillions: Rollover Money to Eclipse DB and
DC Plans' Assets: IRAs Will Be Beneficiaries of Huge Pool Created by Decades of
Participation, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 31, 2003, at 3 (citing Federal Reserve data).
134. For analysis of the reasons for the shift to defined contribution plans and their
impact on workers and firms, see generally ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. MCDERMED, THE
CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN A CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (1990), RICHARD A.
IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY
(1997), and Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, The Stampede Towards Defined
Contribution Plans, 31 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 361 (1992).
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defined benefit plans and/or fostered their termination.'35 Edward Zelinsky,
in fact, takes this thesis one step further. He posits that the passage of
ERISA ushered in a new era that he calls the "defined contribution
society."' 136 Zelinsky recounts the additional tax and labor legislation that
solidified the paradigm shift from the defined benefit to defined
contribution scenario by allowing the creation of individual savings
accounts for retirement, health care, and even education.
137
Albeit unintended, Zelinsky maintains that Congressional action
meant to encourage defined benefit plans has not only pushed companies in
the direction of less costly and risky defined contribution plans, but also
has shaped societal expectations concerning how people think about
retirement. 3 ' In a nutshell, Zelinsky asserts there has been a retirement
revolution and that "Americans today experience and conceive of
retirement savings in the form of individual accounts."'
139
4. Labor Market Structure
The changing structure of the labor market has also influenced the
decline of the defined benefit plan and the resulting weakness of the PBGC.
The structural transformation of the American economy, from unionized
manufacturing companies to service sector operations and high technology
enterprises, has altered the employment relationship in the United States
and its attendant expectations. 40 Along with the role of regulation and the
other environmental influences discussed above, these new objectives,
attitudes, and experiences about work have encouraged the proliferation of
the defined contribution plan or those hybrid plans similar to it.
135. See, e.g., CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 134, at 5 (Government mandated
funding standards "have increased the cost of operating defined benefit plans[.]"); DAN M.
McGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 39-42 (7th ed. 1996) (discussing the
impact of regulatory complexity on defined benefit plans); Kaplan, supra note 9, at 63
(discussing the factors that lead to greater "pension risk being borne by employees").
136. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 454; see also id. at 471-79 (explaining ERISA's role in
encouraging defined contribution pensions).
137. Id. at 482-508. Defined contribution plans have been called "individual account"
plans because an employer pays into a separate employee account. See 1 BOREN & STEIN,
supra note 30, at § 1:07.
138. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 457-58 ("The shift from the defined benefit modality to
the defined contribution one has altered in a fundamental manner the way in which
Americans experience and think about retirement savings").
139. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 533.
140. See Jefferson, supra note 9, at 683 ("[T]he primary cause of the recent decline in
participation in defined benefit plans was a structural shift in the economy rather than
conscious decisions made by plan sponsors and employees.").
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Just as employment relations changed with industrialization and the
demise of the craft union monopoly on skilled labor,' 41 they changed once
again as the economic output of the country shifted from manufacturing
products to services. 42 In order to keep pace with growing competition
from abroad and the speed of technological change, large manufacturing
firms have been attempting to dismantle the scientific management
structures that predominated during the twentieth century. 43 Companies
are replacing limited positions of entry, hierarchical job ladders, and long-
term employment with short-term employment, lateral mobility, general
141. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 527 (2001)
("The ability of [] nineteenth-century skilled workers to control their wages and working
conditions was a result of both their skills and their unions").
142. Unlike the prior transformation which relied primarily on physical labor as workers
moved from farms to factories, the new knowledge-based economy or "information age"
has mental labor and creativity as the force of production. See THOMAS 0. DAVENPORT,
HUMAN CAPITAL: WHAT IT IS AND WHY PEOPLE INVEST IT 26 (1999) (discussing the
"psychic contract" on which a loyalty-based commitment to employment is based); see also
RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND How IT'S TRANSFORMING
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE ix (2002) (discussing the rise of "the
Creative Class [which] derives its identify from its members' roles as purveyors of
creativity"). By the mid-twentieth century, more workers were employed in services
industries than in goods and manufacturing. See STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG, JoHN A. ALIC, &
HOWARD WIAL, NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN
POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 2-3 (1998) (discussing development of the service industry). By
the turn of the twenty-first century, service sector jobs had grown by 36 million to constitute
roughly fifty percent of the gross national product. See Anthony Carnevale & Donna
Desrochers, Training in the Dilbert Economy, 53 TRAINING & DEV. 32 (1999) ("In the
United States, job opportunities shifted from traditional manufacturing such as steel and
textiles to the services sector[.]").
143. Stone, supra note 141, at 554-55, 561-62 (discussing the growth of "boundaryless
careers" and citing Edward E. Lawler III who argues that scientific management and
bureaucratic approaches are no longer appropriate) (citing Edward E. Lawler III, From Job-
Based to Competency-Based Organizations, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 3, 5-6 (1994));
see also Anne S. Miner & David F. Robinson, Organizational and Population Level
Learning as Engines for Career Transitions, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 345, 347
(1994) (commenting that recent research indicates that career paths have changed from
employees moving up along fixed lattices on organizational flow-charts to organizational
fluidity). New organizational behavior theories such as "competency-based organizations"
and "total quality management" have been espoused to replace "scientific management" as
companies emphasize organizational flexibility and promote product quality, speed, and
adaptability to customer desires. See Stone, supra note 141, at 560-68 (discussing the terms
of the "new psychological contract"). Corporations are also undergoing large scale down-
sizing and decentralization. See Charles Heckscher, Defining the Post-Bureaucratic Type,
in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE 14, 27 (Charles Heckscher & Anne Donnellon eds., 1994) (discussing the mass
layoffs of management personnel in the 1980's); Neil Anderson & Ren& Schalk, The
Psychological Contract in Retrospect and Prospect, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 637,
638 (1998) (describing the psychological contract and the concept of an exchange
relationship as its basis).
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training, and skills development.'" The altered recruitment and human
resources practices reflect the fact that both employers and employees
neither expect nor value cradle to grave employment. 14' Asa result, while
companies once offered defined benefit plans that favor long-term
employment, 146 employee benefits packages now include pensions designed
to accommodate the transient nature of employment. 147 The less costly and
more mobile defined contribution plan is consistent with the twenty-first
century workplace involving "just-in-time production, just-in-time product
design, and just-in-time workers.' 48
Consequently, there are legal, economic, and sociological reasons for
the failing financial integrity of existing defined benefit plans and of the
federal pension insurance program that supports them. These contributors
to the private pension problem should be considered in its resolution.
V. PROPOSALS FOR PRIVATE PENSION REFORM
This section attempts to answer the question of how best to secure the
retirement benefits of employees participating in defined benefit pensions
144. See T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases,
42 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 14-16 (2005) (discussing labor market trends); see also PETER F.
DRUCKER, MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE 71 (1995) ("[T]here is no such thing as
'lifetime employment' anymore -- such as was the rule in big U.S. or European companies
only a few years ago[.]"); ROSABETH Moss KANTOR, ON THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT
190 (1997) (commenting on modem management theories in relationship to the "job-
insecurity reality").
145. Stone, supra note 141, at 519 ("[E]mployers and employees have a new
understanding of their mutual obligations . . .in which expectations of job security and
promotional opportunities have been replaced by expectations of employability, training,
human capital development, and networking opportunities.").
146. See supra Part IV.B.3, at 33; see also Stone, supra note 141, at 524, 533 (noting the
longevity linked pay and benefits, including long term pension vesting, under the prior
internal labor market structure). Companies began providing defined benefit pensions to
their employees during the Industrial Revolution. ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK
W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2003). By
the turn of the twentieth century, there were only twelve private pension plans. Id. The
number of private pensions increased to 117 by 1916 with almost 200 by 1926. Id. The
decades following the Second World War, however, marked the most rapid growth of
defined benefit plans due to union demands. Id. at 687; ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
For a detailed account of the economic, sociological, and historical evolution of pensions,
see id. at 11-14.
147. Work practices have adjusted to ever changing production requirements by relying
on temporary work and outsourcing. See Stone, supra note 141, at 539-49 (discussing the
changing nature of employment and refuting the view by some economists that job tenure
and job loss data did not evidence a decline in long-term employment); Zelinsky, supra note
9, at 481 (commenting that either perceived or actual employee mobility status is relevant in
the sense that perception is reality).
148. Stone, supra note 141, at 549; see Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at' 170
(discussing the changes in retirement policies).
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and to salvage at least some insurance benefits for those persons whose
plans have or will terminate. The proposed solution has two parts: 1)
legitimating company conversions from traditional to the cash balance kind
of defined benefit plan and 2) reducing PBGC insurance benefits and/or
delaying the age of eligibility. The first reform is consistent with the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 and the second reform is contrary to it.
Both reforms and their justifications are described below.
A. Legalize Cash Balance Conversions
Given the employment trends toward individual accounts and
individual responsibility, 49 companies have been attempting to convert
their defined benefit plans to hybrid cash balance plans. 50 The conversion,
however, generally results in lower pension benefits for older workers 5'
and arguably contravenes statutory rules against age discrimination.'52
149. See supra text of discussion within Parts IV.B.3, 4.
150. See Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,
and Pensions, 106th Cong. 5 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (listing IBM, AT&T,
CitiGroup, Bell Atlantic, SBC Communications, CIGNA Corp., AETNA, Eastman Kodak,
and CBS among the companies that have converted to cash balance plans.); see also Ellen
E. Schultz & Theo Francis, IBM Ruling Paves Way for Changes to Pensions, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 2006, at A3 (discussing the implications of a recent ruling on the "roughly 400
companies with a total of more than 1,200 cash balance plans among them").
151. KYLE N. BROWN ET AL., THE UNFOLDING OF A PREDICTABLE SURPRISE: A
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL PENSIONS TO HYBRID PLANS
(2000); Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 150-51; see also Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 722
("[A] stable amount contributed annually to a notional cash balance account yields
progressively less in annuity terms as the participant gets older since there are fewer years
for the contribution to accumulate investment interest."). Whether a cash balance formula
satisfies the age-discrimination tests will depend on the specific plan design. See Zelinsky,
supra note 29, at 733 (noting the theoretical possibility of constructing a cash balance plan
that does not violate prohibitions against age discrimination, but concluding that most
companies today have not done so).
152. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 529 (noting that current cash balance plans "violate
the rules for age discrimination .... "); Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 725 (explaining that both
ERISA and the ADEA prohibit the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" from being
reduced because the employee reaches a certain age.); see also I.R.C. § 41 1(b)(l)(H)(i)
(precluding defined benefit plans from reducing the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual.
.. because of the attainment of any age"); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(1)(A) (2000))
(stating that defined benefit plans that reduce the rate of an employee's benefit accrual
because of the attainment of a certain age constitute age discrimination); ERISA §
204(b)(l)(H)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (2006) (stating that a defined benefit plan
does not comply with ERISA if the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual is reduced,
because of the attainment of any age"); 4(i)(1)(A). The Pension Protection Act of 2006
protects cash balance conversions that occur after the effective date of the statute on August
17, 2006. Supra note 11, Title 7.
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Several high profile cases of company conversions contributed to an
extensive dialogue concerning cash balance plans. 53 The debate centers on
the perceived unfairness to long-teim employees who would have received
higher benefits under the conventional defined benefit formula but for the
conversion.5 4  Easing company transitions from the traditional defined
153. See, e.g., Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d
1235 (lth Cir. 2000) (holding that Treasury Regulation § 1.311(a)-li applies to an
employer's calculation of lump sum distributions to employees with defined benefit plans
and that the application of the Treasury Regulation is not contrary to ERISA); Esden v.
Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the pension plan violated the
anti-forfeiture provisions of ERISA given that plaintiff received less than she would have
had she not selected the lump sum payments). Courts are divided on the issue of whether
cash balance plans violate age discrimination rules. See Campbell v. Bankboston, N.A., 327
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting in dicta that "it is by no means clear that the annuity
method is the only permitted method in this context"). Compare Cooper v. IBM Pers.
Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that employer's pension plan did not
constitute age discrimination merely because younger workers have more time to work
before retirement and therefore earn greater interest on their income), Register v. PNC Fin.
Svcs. Group, Inc., No. 04-CV-6097, 2005 WL 3120268, at *4-*8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005)
(holding that the pension plan did not violate age discrimination provisions of ERISA
because the retirement of younger workers would be greater than older workers due to the
interest accruals), Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 88 (D. Md. 2004) (dismissing
plaintiffs claim that the conversion from a defined benefits plan to a cash balance plan
constitute age discrimination under ERISA), and Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding that the conversion from a defined benefits plan to a cash balance
plan did not constitute age discrimination under ERISA) with Richards v. FleetBoston Fin.
Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Conn. 2006) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs claim that the
conversion from a defined benefits plan to a cash balance plan constituted age
discrimination under ERISA). The controversy stems from disagreement over whether to
consider the annual benefit commencing at retirement age or whether to consider the
accrued benefit balance in the individual account. See generally cases cited supra. The
cash balance conversion rules found in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 are prospective
only from the date of its enactment on August 17, 2006. Pension Protection Act of 2006,
supra note 11, at Title VI.
Cash balance plans were the subject of a symposium at the Buffalo Law School in
2001. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake? Cash Balance Plans, New
Comparability Formulas, and the Incoherence of the Nondiscrimination Norm, 49 BUFF. L.
REv. 575 (2001) (explaining the controversy regarding the shift from defined benefits plans
to cash balance plans); Edward A. Zelinsky, Cross-Testing, Nondiscrimination, and New
Comparability: A Rejoinder to Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 675
(2001) (arguing there is no significant differences between small employer defined benefit
plans and comparability plans).
154. Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 754-55; Daniel J. Sennott, Note, Finding the Balance in
Cash Balance Pension Plans, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 1059, 1067; see also Clark & Schieber,
supra note 15, at 150 (suggesting that much of the negative publicity came from the popular
press who relied extensively on selected interviews with workers who were adversely
affected). The age discrimination debate over cash balance conversions also extends to the
"wear-away" provisions where the participants previously earned benefit under the
traditional formula is frozen until the new cash balance approach catches up with it.
Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 728-29. Cash balance conversions are also challenged due to
inadequacy of disclosure of the reduction in benefits. Id. at 730; see also Register v. PNC
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benefit to the cash balance variant is good pension policy even at the
expense (literally) of older workers. Accordingly, legislation should, and
recently did, allow such transitions without age discrimination barriers.'55
Among other recent reform initiatives, the newly enacted Pension
Protection Act of 2006 clarifies that cash balance conversions do not
violate age discrimination rules.
5 6
Recall that cash balance plans offer employees portability based on
lump sum distributions and impose lesser penalties if they leave prior to
Fin. Svcs. Group, Inc., No. 04-CV-6097, 2005 WL 3120268, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005)
(considering the argument that the employer failed to disclose the cash balance formula's
removal of the early retirement subsidy).
155. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 529 (reaching the same conclusion and calling for a
legislative amendment where age discrimination is tested on the basis of theoretical
contributions and not annuity equivalents).
156. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 11, Title VII (stating that a pension
plan does not violate age discrimination provisions if the employee's accrued benefit is
greater than or equal to that of a younger worker who is similarly situated); see also Pension
Security and Transparency Act of 2005, S. 1783, 109th Cong. § 601(a)(5) (2005) (passed
House and Senate May 3, 2006) (stating that a cash balance plan will not violate age
discrimination provisions simply because "it may reasonably be expected that the period
over which interest credits will be made to a participant's accumulation account . . . is
longer for a younger participant."); Hybrid Plan Legislation Introduced, 15 WATSON
WYATT INSIDER 1, 6 (July 2005), available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/pdfs/200507.pdf (cautioning that ambiguity
in language concerning cash balance conversions may affect whether the bill will fulfill its
objective). For other bills supportive of cash balance conversions, see Pension Protection
Act, H.R. 2830, 109th Cong. (2005) (legalizing age differentials of accrued benefits when
defined benefit plans are converted to cash balance plans and adopt the wear away method);
Pension Protection and Portability Act, H.R. 2831, 109th Cong. (2005) (legalizing age
differentials as well). For summaries of the latter two bills, see Bill Summary, Pension
Protection Act (H.R. 2830): Strengthening Retirement Security, Protecting Taxpayers by
Fixing Outdated Worker Pension Laws, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/109th/workforce/pension/ppasummarylong.htm and
Bill Summary, Pension Preservation and Portability Act: Preserving the Portable Benefits
of Cash Balance Pension Plans for American Workers, House Education and Workforce
Committee, 109thCong. (2005), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/109th/workforce/pension/ppasummary.htm. The
Department of Treasury has consistently stated that cash balance plans are not inherently
age discriminatory. See Reductions of Accruals and Allocations Because of the Attainment
of Any Age; Application of Nondiscrimination Cross-Testing Rules to Cash Balance Plans,
67 Fed. Reg. 76123 (proposed Dec. 11, 2002) (stating that a plan violates age discrimination
provisions only if the rate at which benefits accrue is reduced because the employee attains
a specific age); Department of Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's
Fiscal Year 2006 Revenue Proposals 82 (2005) (explaining the proposed Treasury
Regulation (67 Fed. Reg. 76123) and stating that a cash balance plan does not discriminate
on the basis of age as long as the credits paid to older workers are equal or greater than the
credits paid to younger workers); Department of Treasury, General Explanations of the
Administration's Fiscal Year 2005 Revenue Proposals 104 (2004) (coming to the same
conclusion as the 2006 Revenue Proposals that cash balance plans are generally not age
discriminatory).
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reaching retirement eligibility.'57 Besides the ability to recruit and retain a
more mobile workforce, these hybrid pensions are less costly to
companies"' and are perceived as more flexible in their administration. 5 9
Moreover, in a study of seventy-seven employers who converted to
hybrid plans between 1985 and 2000,160 the conversion resulted in a more
equitable allocation of accruals and benefits across workers who leave prior
to retirement eligibility and those who stay longer. 161 It was also found that
hybrid plans like the cash balance version provide more level accruals over
employees' entire career as opposed to an accelerated growth in benefits
late in their career. 62 Attempts have even been made to justify the cash
balance format on the basis that their hypothetical account balances are
easier for employees to understand than the defined benefit calculus. 63 In
any event, it matters not so much why companies seek to convert to the
cash balance format, but more so that they wish to do it.' 64 Whatever their
157. See supra text of discussion within Part III.A.3; see also Robert G. Chambers,
APPWP's Testimony At Senate On 'Hybrid Pension Plans,' TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 22,
1999) available at LEXIS 1999 TNT 183-21, 8) (commenting that the portability of
hybrid pensions are better for women who have relatively short job tenures).
158. BROWN ET AL., supra note 151 (study reporting cost savings of anywhere from ten
percent to as low as one percent); Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 159 (noting frequency
at which employers put the cost savings from conversion back into the plan). IBM, for
example, was facing rising pension costs and decreasing pension income because of the
benefits being paid to middle aged employees. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F.
Supp. 2d 1010, 1020 (S.D. Il1. 2003). Actuaries projected that IBM would produce savings
of almost $500 million by 2009. Id. (noting that savings were the result of future benefit
reductions of up to 47% that would be earned by older IBM employees).
159. Because the required contribution is more certain, cash balance plans make it easier
to forecast future liabilities as opposed to the conventional defined benefit plan. Jonathan
Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REv. 379, 401 (2000). The net effect (including the redistribution of benefits among
plan participants) is similar to the defined contribution plan. The winners who are better off
with the new plan are the younger workers and the losers who are worse off with the new
plan are the senior workers with significant job tenure. Given these similarities, the
argument against such conversions is incongruous in the absence of long-career employee
expectations. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 170 (noting the anomaly); accord
Zelinsky, supra note 29.
160. The study was published by the Pension Research Council of The Wharton School.
Forty-six of the employers established cash balance plans with the remainder adopting
pension equity plans. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 151. Although the study covered
a fifteen-year period, most of the conversions occurred after 1997. Id.
161. Id. at 163.
162. Id. at 171.
163. See Arleen Jacobins, Motorola Adds PEP to its Defined Benefit Plan, 27 PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS No. 14, July 12, 1999, at 1 (citing Sheila Forsberg, Director of Global
Retirement Benefits Strategy of Motorola, Inc.); see also Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 753
(questioning the proposition of better employee comprehensibility of cash balance plans).
164. Conversions to hybrid plans like the cash balance variation have taken place is
primarily large companies in the industries of financial services, utilities, and
telecommunications. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 149. Among small to medium
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objectives, failing to immunize employers from age discrimination claims
for cash balance conversions may facilitate the termination of their defined
benefit plans altogether. 16  In other words, something is better than
nothing.
While it may be true that certain companies will continue to offer a
pension for competitive reasons, 166 experience teaches it will likely take the
form of a defined contribution plan. 67 Statistics confirm that the employer-
based defined benefit plan is a dinosaur on the verge of distinction.168 If
there is a phoenix that rises from its ashes, the right legislative incentives
pursuant to the new Pension Protection Act of 2006 can ensure that it will
be in the cash balance format. 69  Furthermore, for those who
companies, the conversion is largely in the health services industry. Id. All of these
industries have gone through restructuring, which suggests that pension plans are part of
their response to a changing business environment. Id.
165. In defense of their cash balance conversion, an IBM spokesperson noted this option
in their testimony before the Senate. See J. Thomas Bouchard, IBM Human Resources'
Testimony At Senate Hearing On 'Hybrid Pension Plans,' TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 22,
1999) available at LEXIS 1999 TNT 183-21, 19 (stating that "[f]ederal law ... would
have allowed IBM to terminate its pension plan, [and] cease benefit accruals .. "); see also
Colleen T. Congel, Cash Balance Pension Plans Draw Both Praise, Criticism, DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA), Mar. 3, 1999, at J1. In addition to plan terminations, tens of thousands of
workers in the last two years have had their pension plans frozen. Jeanne Sahadi, Pension
Reform: Boon for 401(k)s, Aug. 17, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/08/17/pf/retirement/pension-signing/index.htm.
166. Cf Kaplan, supra note 9, at 70 (arguing that the risk of termination would be
minimized despite additional proposed requirements for 401 (k) plans for business reasons).
Statistics show that the pension participation rates in the new information-based economy
sectors of service (forty-five percent) and retail (thirty percent) are lower than
manufacturing (sixty-eight percent). See Joint Comm. On Tax'n, Present Law and
Background Relating to Employer-Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans 28 (JCX-71-02, 2002).
167. See Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 170; see also supra text of discussion
within Part IV.B.3 (noting the growing number of defined contribution plans). Private
employers favor defined benefit hybrid plans in part due to the tax penalty potentially
incurred should they convert to a defined contribution plan. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 4980
(2002) (requiring an employer to pay income tax on overfunded plans and a fifty percent tax
penalty).
168. Even after Congress passed the Pension Protection Act of 2006 to rehabilitate
traditional pensions, companies like DuPont began freezing them and contributing more to
their employees' 401(k) defined contribution accounts. Theo Francis, DuPont Aims to Slash
Pension Plan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at A2. Verizon Communications, Motorola,
Hewlett-Packard and other companies have also announced freezes of their defined benefit
pensions by stopping new enrollments and/or stopping the accrual of benefits to existing
employees. Jones, supra note 111, at C3; see also supra text of discussion within Part
IV.B.3.
169. Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans Before the
Subcomm. On Oversight of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 18 (2002)
(testimony of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation) (explaining that the only type of defined benefit plan that is increasing in
number is the cash balance plan); Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans,
2007] PRIVATE PENSION LIABILITY AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 521
understandably fear the proliferation of defined contribution plans where
employees assume the risk (and reward) of their own investments,' 70 it
should be remembered that employers sponsoring cash balance defined
benefit plans continue the benefit obligation. Viewed from this vantage,
the cash balance compromise can be seen as the best of both worlds
(defined benefit and contribution) or, alternatively, the lesser of two evils
(cash balance versus defined contribution).
17
1
Cash balance conversions without the existing age discrimination
burdens additionally support ERISA's goal of securing defined benefit
pension plans and continues the stream of much needed PBGC insurance
premiums. 172  The shift to cash balance plans is also in line with
Congressional policy toward Social Security which has raised the
retirement age in which to receive benefits. 73  Because many traditional
defined benefit plans have subsidized early retirement incentives
discouraging continued employment, cash balance conversions without
such incentives are supportive of the goal to encourage workers to extend
their careers and preserve such entitlement programs.
1 74
APPWP Release Opposing Cash Balance Conversion Plan Legislation, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Sept. 22, 1999) available at LEXIS 1999 TNT 183-32, 4 ("Cash balance and other hybrid
defined benefit plans have been the one hopeful sign amid this ominous trend toward plan
termination."). Certainly, labor pressures in the remaining unionized, manufacturing
companies that adhere to defined benefit arrangements may forestall a pension
transformation. In this situation, however, legislative legitimization of the cash balance
conversion would be irrelevant.
170. See Mark J. Warshawsky & John Ameriks, How Prepared Are Americans for
Retirement?, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 54 (Olivia S.
Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, & Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000) (study concluding that a
"majority of American households are predicted to fall short in funding retirement .... ");
Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to Leave
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361, 365
(2002) (questioning "Congress' decision to immunize employers for participant decisions in
401(k) plans and its decision that participants are free to make whatever decisions they
choose .... "); see also Olivia S. Mitchell, James F. Moore, & John W. Phillips, Explaining
Retirement Saving Shortfalls, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT
WEALTH 139 (Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, & Anna M. Rappaport eds., 2000)
("Much has been made in the popular press and among researchers of the failure of
Americans to save adequately for their own retirement.").
171. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 502.
172. See Bill Summary, Pension Preservation and Portability Act: Preserving the
Portable Benefits of Cash Balance Pension Plans for American Workers, House Education
and Workforce Committee (June 9, 2005), at
http://budget.house.gov/republicans/educatesecbysec.pdf (noting that cash balance plans
account for twenty percent of the premium revenue paid by employers to the PBGC).
173. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 169-71; see also Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick,
& Steinmeier, supra note 25, at 309 (noting the interrelationship of social security policy
and employment-based pensions).
174. Clark & Schieber, supra note 15, at 171.
522 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
Finally, prevailing employment norms do not prevent cash balance
conversions despite the decline in benefits to certain older workers.
Employees have neither a classic nor relational (or psychological) contract
right to the continuation of the same pension coverage. As an initial
matter, companies generally reserve the right to amend or even terminate
their pension plans.'75 Thus, employees are entitled to only those benefits
that have accrued.
176
Even the potential legal implications of relational and psychological
contract theory do not support employee expectations to the pension status
quo. 7 7 Both notions are based on the idea that norms beyond the precise
contract may develop during the contractual relationship. 178  Relational
contract doctrine arose as a tool for understanding commercial contracts.
79
Psychological contract theory began in the management literature as a
method for managing business relations. 80 These companion concepts
have been particularly popular in analyzing labor relations and scholars
have been pushing for recognition of these broader norms in all areas of
employment law.' While relational norms have not yet been fully
175. Employers "are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt,
modify, or terminate [] plans." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78
(1995); see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890-91 (1996) (holding that the
Curtiss-Wright rule should be extended to pension plans, in addition to welfare benefit
plans).
176. I.R.C. § 41 l(d)(6)(A) (1996); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1) (2002).
177. Some scholars have rejected the notion that theoretical relational or psychological
norms should have practical use in wrongful discharge law. See Richard A. Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 955 (1984) (noting that there is a
strong fairness argument in favor of freedom of contract); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data,
Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REv.
1901, 1929 (1996) (arguing that employees underestimate their personal risk of job loss).
178. For a discussion of relational contract theory, see Ian R. Macneil, Reflections on the
Relational Theory, in IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 291, 311-14 (David Campbell ed., 2001) and Richard E. Speidel,
The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 823, 823,
828 (2000) (symposium). For a discussion of psychological contract theory, see Stone,
supra note 141, at 549-53.
179. The relational contract concept was popularized by Ian Macneil. Robert C. Bird,
Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 151 (2005); see also
David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in MACNEIL, supra
note 178, at 3 (describing historical development of relational contract theory).
180. The term "psychological contract" arose in the early 1960s in the organizational
behavior and human resources fields and received renewed interest in the late 1980s and
1990s due to corporate downsizing and restructuring. Bird, supra note 179, at 166; see also
Stone, supra note 141, at 552 ("[T]he concept of a psychological contract has received
considerable attention in the organizational behavior and human resource fields."), Marek
V. Roehling, The Origins and Early Development of the Psychological Contract Construct,
3 J. MGMT. HIST. 204, 205 (1997) (tracing the origins of psychological contract theory to the
political theory of social contract).
181. See generally Bird, supra note 179, at 166 (explaining the history and development
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considered as part of pension practice and policy, it makes sense to include
them. 1
82
Katherine Stone, in particular, explained the terms of the new
psychological contract in light of changing labor conditions in the twenty-
first century.'83 The old psychological contract of the twentieth century
encouraged worker attachment to the firm "with its promise of long-term
job security, orderly promotional opportunities, longevity-linked pay and
benefits, and long-term pension vesting . . . . Under the new
psychological contract of the twenty-first century, employers no longer
implicitly promise long-term employment or the prospect of promotion.'85
Rather, they offer general skills training, networking opportunities, and
market-based pay and expect that employees will continue their careers
elsewhere. 86 Employees also have no expectation of job security or, by
extension, a pension plan consistent with that goal.
18 7
Given these mutual expectations, the economic model that is often
used to justify the prohibitions against age discrimination is
inappropriate.'88 During the era of industrialization, labor economists
developed a model of career wage paths to comprehend compensation
levels over the course of an individual's employment at a particular firm. 89
of psychological contract theory and its growing popularity among employment law
scholars); Stone, supra note 141, at 551 (noting the expansion in application for
psychological contract theory from management employees to lower level employees, in
addition to other areas of employment law).
182. Legal scholars have discussed the disadvantage of cash balance conversions to
long-term employees in terms of their expectations. See Zelinsky, supra note 29, at 755
(remarking "that the very real anger generated by cash balance conversions is ultimately a
matter of psychology .... ").
183. Stone, supra note 141, at 548 ("Industrial sociologists, management consultants,
organizational theorists, and corporate executives report with near unanimity that there is a
fundamental change in the implicit psychological contract under which most Americans are
now employed.").
184. Stone, supra note 141, at 524.
185. The description of the overall labor market structure is a generalization that is, of
course, subject to exceptions. See JOSEPH A. MACIARIELLO, LASTING VALUE: LESSONS FROM
A CENTURY OF AGILITY AT LINCOLN ELECTRIC 12, 46, 52 (2000) (discussing explicit long
term employment policy although employees pay their own benefits like health care).
186. Stone, supra note 141, at 524.
187. Stone, supra note 141, at 519, 524. Stone's analysis supports Zelinsky's thesis of a
society that has become accustomed to individual responsibility in individual accounts.
Zelinsky's model of individual responsibility reflected in defined contribution retirement
accounts enabled by legislation is part of a broader set of new expectations and experiences
influenced by workplace dynamics in moving from industrialization to an information age.
188. See Judith D. Fischer, Public Policy and the Tyranny of the Bottom Line in the
Termination of Older Workers, 53 S.C. L. REv. 211, 223 (2002) (explaining that under the
previous economic model, employers have an incentive "opportunistically terminate the
worker who has achieved a higher salary .... ").
189. Stone, supra note 141, at 535. The model was developed to explain the institution
of mandatory retirement. Bird, supra note 179, at 155 n.38 (citing Edward P. Lazear, Why
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The model divides employee wages into phases, with the earlier phases
being where employees are paid less than the amount of their marginal
product and/or less than the value of their opportunity wage.' 90 In the final
"recoupment stage," however, employees receive more pay than their
marginal product value and opportunity wage.' 91 The theory explaining the
model relies on reciprocal implicit promises that employees are willing to
defer compensation in their earlier career in exchange for security and
higher pay in their later career.' 92
The injustice of terminating an employee or arguably, reducing their
retirement benefits during the last phase where the employee was to reap
the benefits of long term employment and deferred compensation, is self-
evident. As discussed supra Part IV.B.4, however, the present economy is
dominated by an entirely different labor market structure. At the core of
relational contract theory is the idea that employment norms change over
time and adjust to new conditions. 93 The conditions marking the new
millennium began their transition thirty years ago. 94 Studies now confirm
that there is neither the expectation of lifetime employment nor presumably
the retirement benefits that accompany it.' 95
Surely, one explanation for an offer of longevity-based future benefits
found in defined benefit plans could be in acceptance of a reduction in cash
wages. 96 Nonetheless, the mere fact that a company sponsors a defined
Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261, 1265 (1979)).
190. Stone, supra note 141, at 535-37.
191. Id. at 537.
192. See GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 29-30 (2d ed. 1975) (noting how students defer
pay while in school to learn a trade in order to earn greater salaries later on); RONALD G.
EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
170-71 (6th ed. 1997); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 249 (1985) (explaining the
difference between employment and commercial contracts); see also Albert DeRoode,
Pensions as Wages, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 287, 287 (June 1913) (expressing deferred wage
theory of pensions).
193. See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 178, at 828 (noting how relational contracts extend
over long periods of time and continually change and adapt under new circumstances).
194. Stone, supra note 141, at 539. This is the same time period that companies began
shifting to defined benefit plans and that Congress enacted ERISA. Clark & Schieber, supra
note 15, at 149.
195. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 127-28, 134
(1997) (study showing that most employees expect reductions in workforce due to economic
pressure); see also Bird, supra note 179, at 194 (explaining that relational norms do not
dictate lifetime employment and that "[1]ayoffs are an expected though unwelcome fact of
modem economic life.").
196. See Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage:
Problems with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Security
Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1369, 1395-97 (2001) (asserting that company
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benefit plan does not necessarily imply that the pension was offered as a
form of wage replacement. Some employers pay the prevailing cash wage
rate for a particular industry and provide pension benefits.1 97 The deferred
wage concept additionally ignores the possibility that an employer may be
willing to accept a lower profit margin to provide a pension plan to
employees. 198
If a company converting to a cash balance pension plan is truly
operating under the vintage internal labor market structure evidenced in the
model, then management should certainly consider compensating those
employees in the last stage of their career. 99 Literature is replete with the
pitfalls of failing to account for legitimate psychological expectations in the
employment relationship.200 To the extent employers do not choose to
accommodate older employees and such employees do not otherwise find
sanctuary under the common law of contract,20' legislation should
terminations of all defined benefit plans for older workers ipso facto deprive them of their
implicit bargain for higher retirement benefits at the end of their employment). Firm loyalty
could arguably be considered a quid pro quo for retirement benefits as well.
197. ALLEN ETAL.,supra note 10, at 17.
198. Id.
199. Because relational contracts change over time, Speidel, supra note 178, at 828, it is
doubtful that even those employees hired before the mass layoffs and restructuring during
the 1980s have psychological bonds with their employer for long-term employment and
longevity-linked pension plans.
200. Bird, supra note 179, at 168-69 (discussing data showing that employees lose trust
and commitment to the firm); Stone, supra note 141, at 550-51 (citing studies indicating the
effects of failing to meet the expectations of a psychological contract); see also Id. at 597
(citing strikes in the early twentieth century as examples of breach of psychological contract
of piece rate workers).
201. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980) (concerning a wrongful discharge case using relational contract language); David J.
Walsh & Joshua L. Schwartz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date,
Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 652 (1996) (noting thirty-eight out of
fifty states accept implied contract claims); see also Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will 92 MICH. L. REv. 8 (1993) (positing
that wrongful discharge rulings implicitly follow an employee life-cycle doctrine that gives
more protection to late-career workers who are paid disproportionately well compared to
their productivity and who hold strong interests in their post-retirement benefits). Federal
preemption under ERISA, however, may prove problematic. Compare Totton v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 27 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding that a claim by discharged
employees that because of breach of employment agreements they suffered loss of pension
benefits that would have accrued had they not been terminated were not preempted by
ERISA), and O'Hollaren v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 730 P.2d 616 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that an employee's cause of action against employer for alleged breach of
contract regarding deferred compensation of wages was not preempted by ERISA), with
Rollo v. Maxicare of Louisiana, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988) (holding that ERISA
preempted employee's state law claims for breach of contract, tortious interference,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair and deceptive trade practices), and
Ferrante v. International Salt Co., 687 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (finding state-law
claims of misrepresentation and breach of employment contract preempted by ERISA). See
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nevertheless not provide a means for legal recourse. While there were bills
pending to the contrary,0 2 the Pension Protection Act of 2006 reasonably
leaves it to business (management) for resolution. °3
Perhaps a less laissez faire ideology will pervade pension reform
efforts in the future. While the regulatory state has inevitably experienced
expansions and contractions throughout history, the primary function of
government has been to keep the machinery of American capitalism
running smoothly and productively.2° For those who distrust economic
ambition no less deeply than ambitious government, 25 allowing cash
balance conversions without age discrimination liability under the new
statute can be seen as a compromise of sorts to keep companies competitive
and their workers within the defined benefit system.
also Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 24
(D.D.C. 1992) (allowing federal common-law cause of action of promissory estoppel
against insurers who had provided an oral interpretation of ambiguous ERISA plan
provisions); Miller v. Coastal Corp., 978 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining
circumstances of estoppel application).
202. Contra Pension Benefits Protection Act of 2005, S. 1304, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005)
(introduced June 23, 2005) (equalizing benefits for older workers due to cash balance
conversions and offering the a choice at retirement between old and new plans); National
Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act of 2005, S. 219, 109th Cong. (2005)
(introduced Jan. 31, 2005) (protecting older employees when there is a cash balance
conversion and prohibiting wear away methods); STAFF OF S. BUDGET COMM., 108th Cong.,
PRESIDENT BUSH'S 2005 BUDGET 23 (2004), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-budget/republican/analysis/2004/Instant/20051nstant.pdf.
203. Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 11, Title VII; see also Zelinsky, supra
note 9, at 530 (suggesting that companies provide workers a choice between the two plans
or provide them extra credits to account for the difference). Notably, the redistribution of
benefits among plan participants due to a conversion is not entirely different from the effect
of changes to Social Security in 1977 that reduced annual benefits such that different
workers obtained different benefits based on their birth years. Clark & Schieber, supra note
15, at 173 n.14.
204. From a public policy perspective, pensions may also be justified on efficiency
grounds. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 13-14. If pensions are provided in lieu of
increased wages, known as the deferred wage concept, there is no added compensation cost
to the employer. Id. at 14. If pension contributions are paid along with the prevailing wage
and the employer cannot or chooses not to absorb the cost as part of a lower profit margin,
then the extra compensation costs may potentially be passed on to the public in the form of
higher prices. Id. Consequently, the cost of economic security of the aged is spread over
time to numerous persons. Id. (discussing the rationale that providing pensions allows
retirees to have greater consumption levels which in turn assist the economy).
205. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 523 (doubting whether government paternalism is
needed or will likely succeed in the private pension system) (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The Uncertain Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003) and William G. Gales,
Comment, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 116, 116-20 (Henry J.
Aaron ed., 1999)).
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B. Reduce PBCG Insurance Benefits
Because ERISA requires the PBGC to be self-financing, past
regulatory initiatives have sought to remedy the corporation's failing
financial health by increasing its funding.2 °6 For instance, ERISA was
amended to require companies to reimburse the PBGC for benefits paid to
plan participants.20 7  Legal reforms have also increased employer
premiums.208 Yet none of these reforms have remedied the problem. 20 9 In
fact, after studying the PBGC's desperate financial situation, the
Congressional Budget Office reported in 2005 that an increase in premiums
will not work.210 The CBO concluded that the "levels of loss . . .would
likely exceed the ability of the other private defined benefit plan sponsors
in the system to cover those losses through higher premiums . ... 2,,1 The
foregoing conclusion notwithstanding, the Pension Security &
Transparency Act of 2005 recently passed by both the House and the
Senate proposed increasing premiums once again.212 However, that bill
was superseded by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 which limits such
increases to those companies who underfund their pension plans.213
206. A recent proposal also attempts to increase the amount of the PBGC funding by
suggesting that the corporation be given a superpriority claim in bankruptcy proceedings.
Lassiter, supra note 109, at 953-54; accord Jill L. Uylaki, Promises Made, Promises
Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Pension Plan Income in the Wake of Employer
Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation?, 6 ELDER L.J. 77 (1998).
207. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(1987). The PBGC's entitlement to collection is largely a right without a remedy. See 2005
PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 6, 10 (discussing the
need for legislative reform in order to protect PBGC's future finances and noting that certain
PBGC loans are typically not repaid).
208. See Pension Protection Act of 1987, enacted as Title IX of the Omnibus Budget &
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Public L. No. 100-203 (imposing a penalty if information is not
filed in a timely manner with the corporation); see also PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,
638 (1990) ("Congress repeatedly has been forced to increase the annual premiums [of
employers.]").
209. See discussion supra Part IV.
210. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 6 (citing
September 2005 Congressional Budget Office Report).
211. Id.
212. For single-employer pensions, the annual flat-rate premiums are $19 per participant
and annual variable rate premiums are paid by underfunded plans at a rate of $9 per $1000
of under-funding. Id. at 8. For multiemployer pensions, the annual flat-rate premiums
drops to $2.60 per participant with no variable rate premiums. Id. at 11. Under the Pension
Security and Transparency Act of 2005, flat rate premiums would have been raised for
single-employer plans from $19 to $30 per participant. Pension Security and Transparency
Act of 2005, supra note 156, § 401(a). Other bills also offered the same solution of raising
premiums. National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act of 2005, S. 219,
109th Cong. (2005).
213. The prior law exempted companies from the variable rate premiums if they satisfied
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Rather than increasing the input, Congress should consider decreasing
the output by reducing PBGC benefit levels and/or raising the age of
retirement. Under the current statutory regime, the benefits scheduled to be
paid are not actuarially sustainable even with the prospect of increasing
premium rates. Accordingly, akin to proposals to solve the problem of
Social Security, 1 4 Congress should attempt to restore actuarial balance by
reducing the PBGC's benefit commitments. 5
The PBGC was never meant to fully replace pension benefits. It
provides mandatory insurance of catastrophic risk and guarantees the
payment of basic pension benefits when underfunded plans terminate. The
maximum guarantee is set by law for the year in which the plan ended.21 6
For pension benefits beginning in 2006, for instance, the PBGC pays a
monthly amount up to $3,971.59 ($47,659.08 annually) for participants at
age 65 and less for pensions beginning earlier. 1 7  With catastrophes
unfortunately becoming a more frequent occurrence,2 s a reduction in
benefits will allow at least some income to reach the greatest number of
the full-funding limit of ninety percent. Legislative Notice, U.S. Senate Republican Policy
Committee, supra note 11, at 10. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 eliminates the full-
funding exemption so that all underfunded plans are required to pay variable rate premiums.
Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 11, tit. IV; see also Press Release, White House,
Fact Sheet: The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060817.html (explaining that the
legislation requires "companies that under-fund their pension plans to pay additional
premiums").
214. See, e.g., HENRY" J. AARON & JOHN B. SHOVEN, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES
PRIVATIZE SOCIAL SECURITY? 89-94 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed.) (1999) (suggesting
reforms designed to bring social security outlays and receipts into balance); PETER A.
DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY: A BALANCED APPROACH 23, 83,
87-88, 93, 167-70, 183 (2004) (suggesting reforms designed to bring social security outlays
and receipts into balance).
215. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 531 (commenting that delaying benefits for Social
Security is economically equivalent to starting a lower level of benefits earlier).
216. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322-1322b (2006) (describing the circumstances under which the
corporation will guarantee payment of nonforfeitable benefits). For computing the
maximum guaranteed benefits, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 4022.22-4022.23 (describing maximum
benefit computation).
217. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables,
http://www.pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/find-your-pension-plan/content/page789.htmi.
218. See, e.g., Press Release, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC Assumes
Pension Plan of Plymouth Rubber Co. (July 19, 2006), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-
archive/2006/prO6-59.html (confirming PBGC's assumption of Plymouth Rubber's pension
obligations); Press Release, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC Protects
Pensions at Victory Memorial Hospital (July 5, 2006), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-
archive/2006/prO6-54.html (confirming PBGC's assumption of Victory Memorial Hospital's
pension obligations); Press Release, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC
Assumes Pension Plan of Pittsburgh Brewing Co. (May 23, 2006),
http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/2006/prO6-48.html (confirming PBGC's
assumption of Pittsburgh Brewing Co.'s pension obligations).
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persons for the longest period of time. Indeed, the PBGC is already
responsible for the pensions of more than one million people with
additional new participants expected in the near future.219 Moreover,
sustainability would be heightened without altering the cost-benefit
calculation for companies or risking even more plan terminations as
compared with the proposal to raise premiums.220
The reality is that the PBGC is unlikely to miraculously transcend the
demise to which destiny has consigned it in this defined contribution age.
Unless the government enters the business of fixing broken companies, it is
doubtful whether even Congress can succeed in putting Humpty-Dumpty
together again. Nevertheless, despite the notable decline of defined benefit
plans, they are still a significant part of the private pension system.22'
Lowering the PBGC's projected benefit payments and/or raising the
retirement age prolongs the defined benefit insurance program in line with
ERISA and in light of the business environment. It should therefore be
considered as part of the retirement reform agenda.
Admittedly, be it law or politics, policy arguments in support of law
reform depend upon predictions and value judgments. Policy analysis is
complicated by the fact that laws are often meant to serve multiple values
and purposes which represent a compromise among their competing
aims.222 As here, the solution involves a resolution of the conflicts and an
ordering of the values through a balancing process.23
219. During 2004, the PBGC paid over $3 billion in benefits to more than 518,000
people. 2004 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. It added almost 150,000 new
participants, well above historical norms. Id. at 5. "At year-end, PBGC was responsible for
the pensions of more than [one] million people, including 443,000 who will begin to receive
benefits from PBGC when they retire in the future and 100,000 who are receiving or will
receive benefits through PBGC's financial assistance to multiemployer plans." Id. at 4. By
2005, it added nearly 300,000 more beneficiaries. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
220. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 477 (indicating the premium payment structure of the
PBGC generates costs associated with defined benefit plans that do not exist with other
pension plans); see also id. at 525-26 (advising Congress to "do no harm").
221. They are sponsored by large companies of long-standing, including many
companies covered by collective bargaining agreements. See discussion supra notes 68-69
and accompanying text. It was union demands that, ironically, shifted the risk of pension
fund failure to the government in the first place. Wooten, supra note 3, at 738 (discussing
how union strategy attempted to alter the basic relationships among benefit levels, cost, and
risk). With that government safety net now at risk, union bargaining strategy may perhaps
shift to other alternatives like increased funding levels that reduce the necessity of
government assistance.
222. See, e.g., WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 135 (2002)
(explaining how policy goals can take the form of targeted societal goals, instrumental
concerns, or abstract values).
223. Id. at 68; see also J.C. Smith, Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 277, 326-27 (1998) (discussing the need to order competing values
hierarchically).
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Do the reforms encourage the continuation of defined benefit plans?
Should they? If so, how should they accomplish that goal? By
encouraging cash balance conversions and removing existing
discrimination deterrents? If the law does not facilitate such conversions,
will companies truly cancel their conventional defined benefit plans? If the
law does account for such conversions, should it require companies to
compensate career employees who will receive lower benefits? If it does
mandate compensation, will this defeat the purpose of encouraging defined
benefit plans? Will companies compensate older employees anyway? If
no compensation is paid, what is the likelihood that the reduction in
benefits will be unfair or unjust?
Also, can legal reform save the PBGC? Should it? If so, how? By
increasing insurance premiums or by decreasing benefits? Will increasing
premiums thwart the purpose of encouraging defined benefit plans? To
what extent? Will decreasing benefits really assist in the long-term
sustainability of the PBGC? At what point should that goal be altered by
consideration of the social welfare? Is it better to give more people less or
less people more? And so on. There are simply no easy answers to the
complex questions involved in retirement reform. Whatever laws (such as
the new Pension Protection Act) prevail in future printing of the Code
books, the current crisis in corporate America and its widespread social
implications is sure to keep pension funding at the heart of political
discourse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employers voluntarily provide pension benefits to ninety million
American workers over and above their social security contributions.2 4
They have become the primary vehicle of safeguarding against the
economic risk of old age. 5 With the Pension Protection Act of 2006
recently enacted into law, it is a good time to talk about retirement.
Like business managers, politicians must wager their salvation based
upon imperfect knowledge. Perhaps the fixation on individual accounts
224. Reece, supra note 39, at 140 (citing Chamber of Commerce News Release).
225. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 7 ("For the first time in several years, limits on
allowable pension contributions were actually increased. The tremendous increases in
disposable income over the last 50 years previously had not resulted in any increase in the
proportion of personal savings. It will be interesting to see whether the expansion of
pension contribution limits ... has a sustained impact on personal savings."); Reece, supra
note 39, at 70 (providing statistics showing retirees depend on pensions and savings over
Social Security); see also John B. Shoven, Return on Investment: Pensions are How
American Saves, Assoc. OF PRIVATE PENSION AND WELFARE PLANS (Sept. 1995) (noting that
pensions grew faster than total wealth during the 1980s and concluding that "pension are
how American saves").
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and individual accountability is a "national fantasy"226 or the "ticking
demographic time bomb"2 27 some prophesy. With employees covered by
defined contribution plans only now beginning to retire, it is simply too
228soon to tell. What we do know is that the "overregulation" of defined
benefit plans pursuant to ERISA and its progeny has had the unintended
effect of facilitating their failure and the financial distress of the PBGC.229
Legalizing the hybrid cash balance conversions as well as decreasing
PBGC insurance benefits and/or increasing the age of eligibility attempt to
avoid additional pension costs and complexities. They are also consistent
with the changed conditions in the world of work. The proposed legal
reforms further the explicit goal of ERISA in encouraging defined benefit
plans and the implicit role of government in a free enterprise economy.
While not all crises call for legislative correction, the foregoing policies in
support of changed company pension practices are a reasonable means of
retaining retirement security in an increasingly insecure world.
226. Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on Retirement, 12
ELDER L.J. 245, 247 (2004).
227. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today:
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2000).
228. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 59.
229. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 9; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.3. At
least some manufacturing firms that offer traditional defined benefit pensions are optimistic
that they will benefit from the overhaul of funding rules in the new legislation. See Scott
Suttell, Pension Gains, Crain's Cleveland Bus. on the Web (Aug. 18, 2006),
http://www.crainscleveland.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=200660818009. Other
companies are skeptical. Because of the new pension accounting rules that require a
deduction of plan shortfalls from net worth, the risk to stock prices and loan covenants may
be too great to continue their defined benefit plans. Jones, supra note 111, at C3.
